#### Advantage \_\_\_ is credibility

#### The embargo destroys US credibility and costs international capital

Iglesias 2012(Commander Carlos Iglesias United States Navy, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba,” 10-3-12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408)

Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to gain from ¶ a more inclusive and less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N. anti-embargo ¶ resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt from General Assembly scrutiny have had ¶ longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically undercut American’s legitimacy ¶ and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New York City and ¶ across the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have netted few if any ¶ national objectives, all the while depleting substantial national soft power. The costbenefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain exceedingly unfavorable, if not ¶ outright counter-productive.

#### No link turns—the embargo shreds foreign policy coherence

Griswold 10/12/05 (Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba”, http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/four-decades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba)

Economic sanctions rarely work. Trade and investment sanctions against Burma, Iran, and North Korea have failed to change the behavior of any of those oppressive regimes; sanctions have only deepened the deprivation of the very people we are trying to help. Our research at the Cato Institute confirms that trade and globalization till the soil for democracy. Nations open to trade are more likely to be democracies where human rights are respected. Trade and the development it creates give people tools of communication-cell phones, satellite TV, fax machines, the Internet-that tend to undermine oppressive authority. Trade not only increases the flow of goods and services but also of people and ideas. Development also creates a larger middle class that is usually the backbone of democracy.¶ President Bush seems to understand this powerful connection between trade and democracy when he talks about China or the Middle East. In a speech on trade early in his first term, the president noted that trade was about more than raising incomes. “Trade creates the habits of freedom,” the president said, and those habits begin “to create the expectations of democracy and demands for better democratic institutions. Societies that open to commerce across their borders are more open to democracy within their borders. And for those of us who care about values and believe in values—not just American values, but universal values that promote human dignity—trade is a good way to do that.”¶ The president has rightly opposed efforts in Congress to impose trade sanctions against China because of its poor human rights record. In sheer numbers, the Chinese government has jailed and killed far more political and religious dissenters than has the Cuban government. And China is arguably more of a national security concern today than Castro’s pathetic little workers’ paradise. Yet China has become our third largest trading partner while we maintain a blanket embargo on commercial relations with Cuba. President Bush understands that economic engagement with China offers the best hope for encouraging human rights and political reforms in that country, yet he has failed to apply that same, sound thinking to Cuba.¶ In fact, the Venezuelan government of Hugo Chavez is doing more to undermine America’s national interest today than either Cuba or China. Chavez shares Castro’s hatred for democratic capitalism, but unlike Castro he has the resources and money to spread his influence in the hemisphere. Chavez is not only bankrolling Cuba with discounted oil but he is also supporting anti-Americans movements in Nicaragua and other countries in our neighborhood. Yet we buy billions of dollars of oil a year from Venezuela’s state oil company, we allow huge Venezuelan investments in our own energy sector, and Americans—last time I checked—can travel freely to Venezuela. The one big difference between Venezuela and Cuba is that we don’t have half a million politically active Venezuelan exiles living in a swing state like Ohio. This is not an argument for an embargo against Venezuela, but for greater coherence in U.S. foreign policy. In a world still inhabited by a number of unfriendly and oppressive regimes, there is simply nothing special about Cuba that warrants the drastic option of a total embargo.

#### The plan reverses anti-Americanism and revitalizes diplomacy

Hill et al. 4/13/09 (Brigadier General John Adams (Ret.), General James T. Hill (Ret.), Commanding General for US SOUTHCOM 2002-2004, Lieutenant General John G. Castellaw (Ret.), Rear Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret.), Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman (Ret.), Superintendent of the United States Military Academy 1996-2001, Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy (Ret.), Major General Paul D. Eaton (Ret.), General Barry R. McCaffrey (Ret.), Commanding General for US SOUTHCOM 1994-1996, Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard (Ret.), Col. Lawrence B. Wilkerson (Ret.), assistant to Colin Powell during tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, Rear Admiral Donald J. Guter (Ret.), General Johnnie E. Wilson (Ret.), Letter from US military officials to President Obama regarding Cuba policy, prepared by the New America Foundation / US – Cuba Policy Initiative, 4/13/09, <http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/National_Security.pdf>)

The current policy of isolating Cuba has failed, patently, to achieve our ends. Cuba ceased to be a military threat decades ago. ¶ At the same time, Cuba has intensified its global diplomatic and economic relations with nations as diverse as China, Russia, ¶ Venezuela, Brazil, and members of the European Union. It is hard to characterize such global engagement as isolation. ¶ Though economically weak, the Castro government has kept the broad support of its people by responding to economic ¶ shocks and providing universal access to health care and education. There will be no counter-revolution any time soon. ¶ Instead, the current embargo serves more to prop up the Castro regime and shows no sign of triggering a popular uprising ¶ against the communist government it runs. When hard times fall on the Cuban people, inevitably, the Cuban government ¶ blames the U.S. “bloqueo” for the suffering. And the people, with a strong sense of national sovereignty, rally to their flag. ¶ Even worse, the embargo has inspired a significant diplomatic movement against U.S. policy. As military professionals, we ¶ understand that America’s interests are best served when the United States is able to attract the support of other nations to our ¶ cause. When world leaders overwhelmingly cast their vote in the United Nations against the embargo and visit Havana to ¶ denounce American policy, it is time to change the policy, especially after 50 years of failure in attaining our goals. ¶ The congressional initiative to lift the travel ban for all Americans is an important first step toward lifting the embargo, a ¶ policy more likely to bring change to Cuba. It begins to move the United States in an unambiguous direction toward the kind ¶ of policy—based on principled engagement and proportional and discriminate action that was the hallmark of your ¶ presidential campaign. Combined with renewed engagement with Havana on key security issues such as narcotics trafficking, ¶ immigration, airspace and Caribbean security, we believe the U.S. will be on a path to rid ourselves of the dysfunctional ¶ policy your administration has inherited. ¶ It is a clear cut case. During the Cold War, the U.S. encouraged Americans to travel to the Soviet bloc resulting in more ¶ information, more contact, and more freedom for captive peoples, and ultimately the end of the Berlin Wall and the Cold War ¶ itself. This idea of engagement underlies our current policies toward Iran, Syria and North Korea all much graver concerns to ¶ the United States – where Americans are currently free to travel. By sending our best ambassadors—the American people—¶ to engage their Cuban neighbors, we have a much better chance of influencing the eventual course of Cuban affairs. Broader ¶ economic engagement with the island through additional commercial and people-to-people contacts will in time promote a ¶ more pluralist and open society. And, by actually striking down an element of the embargo, that signal will be sent to the ¶ government in Havana. ¶ Mr. President, around the world, leaders are calling for a real policy shift that delivers on the hope you inspired in your ¶ campaign. Cuba offers the lowest-hanging fruit for such a shift and would be a move that would register deeply in the minds ¶ of our partners and competitors around the world.

#### And it builds US credibility within institutions and breaks the image of punitive unilateralism

Dickerson 1/14/10 (Sergio, Lt. Col., US Army, Strategy Research Project, “UNITED STATES SECURITY ¶ STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack ¶ Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am ¶ confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new ¶ multilateralism 4¶ To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly ¶ since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5¶ - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba. The ¶ argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia ¶ and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towards¶ Cuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., ¶ it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of ¶ the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.

#### This spills over to solve global problems

Dickerson 1/14/10 (Sergio, Lt. Col., US Army, Strategy Research Project, “UNITED STATES SECURITY ¶ STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip ¶ away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a ¶ new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust ¶ will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider ¶ that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and ¶ America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to ¶ flourish. ¶ If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for ¶ multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and ¶ credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. ¶ President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations ¶ like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could ¶ begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing ¶ true peace for years to come.

#### Decline is not inevitable — smart policies can maintain relative U.S. power.

Nye 13 — Joseph S. Nye, Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor and Former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2013 (“American power in the 21st century will be defined by the ‘rise of the rest’,” *Washington Post*, June 28th, Available Online at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-28/opinions/40255646\_1\_american-power-u-s-economy-united-states, Accessed 07-20-2013)

On the question of absolute — rather than relative — American decline, the United States faces serious domestic problems in debt, secondary education and political gridlock. But these issues are only part of the picture. Of the many possible futures, stronger cases can be made for the positive over the negative. Among the negative futures, the most plausible is one in which the United States overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inward and closing itself off to the strength it obtains from openness. But barring such mistaken strategies, there are, over a longer term, solutions to the major problems that preoccupy us. Of course, for political or other reasons, such solutions may remain forever out of reach. But it is important to distinguish between situations that have no solutions and those that, at least in principle, can be solved.¶ Decline is a misleading metaphor and, fortunately, President Obama has rejected the suggested strategy of “managing decline.” As a leader in research and development, higher education and entrepreneurial activity, the United States is not in absolute decline, as happened in ancient Rome. In relative terms, there is a reasonable probability that the United States is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in the coming decades. We do not live in a “post-American world,” but neither do we live any longer in the “American era” of the late 20th century. In terms of primacy, the United States will be “first” but not “sole.” No one has a crystal ball, but the National Intelligence Council (which I once chaired) may be correct in its 2012 projection that although the unipolar moment is over, the United States probably will remain first among equals among the other great powers in 2030 because of the multifaceted nature of its power and legacies of its leadership.¶ The power resources of many states and non-state actors will rise in the coming years. U.S. presidents will face an increasing number of issues in which obtaining our preferred outcomes will require power with others as much as power over others. Our leaders’ capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of our hard and soft power. Simply put, the problem of American power in the 21st century is not one of a poorly specified “decline” or being eclipsed by China but, rather, the “rise of the rest.” The paradox of American power is that even the largest country will not be able to achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others

#### Engagement with Cuba improves foreign policy credibility—immediate success generates momentum

Colvin 12/13/2008 (Jake, fellow with the New Ideas Fund, a group that seeks new approaches and paradigms for U.S. national security and foreign policy. He is also Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and oversees the Cuba initiative of USA\*Engage, “The Case for a New Cuba Policy”, http://web.archive.org/web/20120904201743/http://www.newideasfund.org/proposals/Colvin%20-%20Cuba%20-%20Master.pdf)

A signal to the world¶ Beyond the domestic political benefit of acknowledging a changing Cuban American ¶ community, a new approach to Cuba would send an important signal to the world. While ¶ complex foreign policy issues from Darfur to Iraq will take years to resolve in cooperation with ¶ the international community, with respect to Cuba it would be relatively easy to demonstrate ¶ clear, progressive change immediately through a simple Federal Register notice and a new ¶ diplomatic approach. Even small changes to policy and rhetoric would send a strong message to ¶ U.S. allies, particularly in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, who will be looking for early ¶ signs from the next administration.¶ The United States‘ reputation in the world has slid dramatically over the past eight years. Large ¶ majorities in key allies such as Canada (77 percent), France (75 percent), Mexico (66 percent), ¶ and the United Kingdom (67 percent) say that their opinion of the United States has gotten worse since the start of the Bush presidency. Less than one-half of respondents in Canada and the ¶ United Kingdom think that the relationship with the United States is a friendship.40 A troubling ¶ number think that Bush and the U.S. presence in Iraq are greater threats to world peace than Kim ¶ Jong-Il and the Iranian nuclear program, and view Beijing more favorably than Washington.41 In ¶ order for the United States to improve its image in the world, the next president will have to offer new policies that demonstrate a commitment to working with allies and a pragmatic,engagement-oriented approach to foreign policy challenges.¶ Cuba policy offers this opportunity. Embargo politics have kept the United States from pursuing ¶ easily attainable changes to policy. With the stroke of a pen, the next president could unilaterally ¶ demonstrate that he is willing to try a different approach by allowing greater freedom of travel ¶ for U.S. citizens to Cuba. A diplomatic approach to Cuba would signal that the president is willing to pursue peaceful solutions to difficult problems, even if those initial efforts do not bear fruit immediately. Multilaterally, overtures to U.S. allies to promote rule of law, economic development, and human rights in Cuba would be a welcome change from the unproductive criticism that has become the hallmark of recent U.S. policy. Compared with difficult challenges such as stabilizing Afghanistan or containing Iran, Cuba is an ¶ easy place to showcase change. ―The next administration needs to have an early win,‖ says ¶ former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Peter Romero.¶ 42 Romero, ¶ who was a key player in the Clinton administration‘s second-term efforts to increase people-topeople exchanges, adds, ―We‘ve been on a losing streak for so long, something that breaks the paradigm and shows bold strokes would have an enormous impact. I think you can do that with ¶ Cuba.‖

#### Cross-regime cooperation causes broad global consensus which solves international stability

Kupchan and Mount, 2009 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, “The Autonomy Rule,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2009, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf>)

An order that welcomes political diversity would constitute a stark departure from the norms and practices that have governed international politics since World War II. Western norms would no longer enjoy pride of place; authority would not be concentrated in Washington, nor legitimacy derived solely from a transatlantic consensus. Instead, Western concepts of legitimacy would combine with those of other countries and cultures, distributing responsibility to a wider array of states. By casting the net widely, a more inclusive order would encourage stability by broadening consensus, producing new stakeholders, and further marginalizing states that are predatory at home or abroad.

#### Institutional legitimacy is the only way to exercise hegemony to prevent extinction

Kromah 9 (Lamii Moivi Kromah, Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, February 2009, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, <http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf>)

A final major gain to the United States from the Pax Americana has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States. This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership; post war reconstruction of Germany and Japan exhibit all these features. Moderates were giving a great voice in the way government business was done Constitutions in these countries were changed and amended to ensure democratic practices and martial elites were prosecuted. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."34 After WWII the U.S. established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and others. In each these new regimes it make Germany a member and eventual an integral partner. Germany's freedom of movement has been limited by domestic institutional constraints overlain by a dense network of external institutional constraints on autonomous decision making in the domains of security and economy. Thus a powerful combination of constitutional design, membership in integrative international institutions and the continued division of Germany achieved the post-war American objective of 'security for Germany and security from Germany'.35 Others are even more sanguine about the prospect of an active German hegemony. One body of literature, such as Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?' International Affairs, 72 (1996), 9-32., focuses upon the constraining effects of Germany's 'exaggerated multilateralism' or a reliance upon 'indirect institutional power'." The institutionalization of German power has produced an empowered but non-threatening Germany that sets the European agenda and dominates the institutional evolution of the European Union (EU) and its governance structures.36 The cornerstone of German security policy is the perpetuation of NATO, including the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe and the U.S. nuclear guarantee. In 1994 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the U.S. presence as an "irreplaceable basis for keeping Europe on a stable footing," and that sentiment is echoed routinely by high German officials. German participation in the Western European Union and the Eurocorps has been based on the presumption that European military forces must be integrated into NATO rather than standing as autonomous units.37For industrial societies, the Second World War destroyed more wealth than it created because it disrupted the global trade on which wealth had come to depend. No longer could states gain in wealth by seizing territory and resources from each other as they had done during the mercantilist period in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. WWII broke the world power of the Western European states. Even without the advent of nuclear weapons, it drove home the lesson of the First World War that the major European states could no longer wage war amongst themselves without bringing about the political and physical impoverishment of their societies, and perhaps destroying them completely. By 1945 it was clear that all out war had become an irrational instrument in relations among major powers. Almost no conceivable national objective short of lastditch survival justified the costs of undertaking it. This lesson was as manifestly true for revolutionary workers’ states like the Soviet Union as it was for conservative, bourgeois, capitalist states like Britain and France.38 A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States.39 This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."40 After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project.41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.43 **America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and** manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense**, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations**. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers48, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”.51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony.52 If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership as been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, **institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded.** Institutions provide opportunitiesfor commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. **Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes**, although **the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic**. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.55 By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own wellbeing depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security.57

#### The United States federal government should substantially reduce its sanctions on Cuba

#### Advantage\_\_\_ is the OAS

#### Current Cuba policy delegitimizes the Organization of American States and undermines regional influence

Suver 4/24/12 (Roman, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Looking back on the Cuba distraction at Cartagena and the Failure of the US Latin America Policy”, www.coha.org/looking-back-on-the-cuba-distraction-at-cartagena-and-the-failure-of-the-u-s-latin-america-policy/

This pronouncement and the U.S.’ opposition to Cuba’s future involvement in OAS-related hemispheric gatherings effectively acted as a unilateral veto, as Canada was the only other summit attendee to oppose Cuba’s reintegration, though Prime Minister Stephen Harper reportedly considered supporting the majority position on Cuba’s unconditional readmittance. This stubborn and clearly ideologically-based U.S. move served to do nothing but further alienate the U.S. from the region at a time when it is actively attempting to build both economic and political alliances. Furthermore, by exacerbating the divide between traditional U.S. pan-American policy and the Latin American position through his comments, Obama ensured that the topic of Cuba would continue to dominate the discussion throughout the summit, instead of allowing for a unified hemispheric discourse on other important and pressing regional matters to command media attention. Not surprisingly, amidst the polarizing environment in Cartagena, the Sixth Summit of the Americas concluded without a joint declaration on the agenda’s subjects, further accentuating the dysfunctional nature of current hemispheric politics.¶ Ahead of the Summit, Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, wrote a letter to the summit’s host, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, in which he declared his intention to boycott the meeting in protest of Cuba’s ongoing exile. He further pledged that Ecuador would boycott any future gatherings that excluded Cuba as long as he remains in office, and urged fellow ALBA members to do the same. While it appeared last week that no other nation would take similar steps, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega abstained from attending at the last minute, boycotting the event on the same grounds as Correa, despite his government’s presence in Cartagena. There had been speculation prior to the meeting that some Latin American countries, especially those with memberships in ALBA, would decline to join Ecuador in boycotting the event in hopes that the U.S. would soften its position on Cuba during the weekend’s meeting, making a gesture that could worsen trade relations with the U.S. unnecessary. However, after Obama’s steadfast reiteration of the U.S.’ stance, all eight ALBA members moved swiftly to decry the Cuban situation, vowing to boycott all subsequent Summits of the Americas if Cuba is not granted unconditional participation. Perhaps not so surprisingly, this same sentiment was echoed by some of South America’s most influential nations, including Mercosur members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¶ The increasingly vocal and adamant calls for Cuba’s inclusion by Latin America, and the growing number of provocative comments being made by Latin American leaders about ending North American hegemony in the region, are ominous signs for the abiding strength of the U.S.’ influence in the region. With the prospect of the majority of the next Summit’s attendees boycotting the event under the current status quo, the future of the OAS and North American participation in Latin American affairs appears noticeably bleak. There are already a number of regional organizations which exclude the U.S. and Canada, CELAC and UNASUR among them, and their increasing relevance to international cooperation in the Americas does not bode well for North America. If the U.S. continues to persistently adhere to its current stance on Cuba through to the 2015 Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama, there is a distinct possibility that the OAS could lose all legitimacy as well as its influence as exasperated Latin American countries refuse to participate. This could lead to both a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Cuba, and greater cooperation and concessions by the U.S., pursuant to a more unified and egalitarian Western Hemisphere dynamic. Conversely, if the U.S. continues its archaic and neo-imperialistic stance, bodies like CELAC would stand to gain considerable influence, and could perhaps even replace the OAS as the hemisphere’s primary pan-American body and standard-bearer for regional cooperation.¶ In either scenario, the inescapable reality becomes quite clear; no matter how U.S. policy towards Latin America evolves in the near future, the U.S.’ longstanding and powerful influence in Central and South America is beginning to wane. Newly developing export markets and swift economic growth in Latin America are bolstering the region’s ability to function independently of more developed powers like the U.S., and the more the region continues to develop, the stronger its thirst for self-determinism will become. As Central and South America continue to modernize in their quest to join the ranks of developed world powers, the U.S. will continue to watch its previously formidable regional will diminish. The more Washington is willing to proactively amend its foreign policy towards Latin America to promote a more respectful and reciprocal partnership arrangement, the better its prospects will become in forging long-term amicable alliances and beneficial economic partnerships with a rapidly upsurging region.

#### Lifting the embargo improves hemispheric dialogue

Meyer 4/8/13 (Peter, CRS Analyst in Latin America Affairs, “Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress”, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=12&ved=0CDgQFjABOAo&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hsdl.org%2F%3Fview%26did%3D735022&ei=6RcaUsTSDMqT2QWrvYFI&usg=AFQjCNEJiXMS8Gf1AQ19Y\_PlL5Nj\_fXEGA&sig2=qNsFfyBS3N6r0sCguR\_JAw)

Policy Considerations ¶ Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the country through sanctions while providing support to the Cuban people. Although Members of Congress generally have agreed on the overall goals of U.S. policy—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—they have disagreed about how best to achieve those objectives. Some argue that maintaining strict sanctions is the only way to produce change in Cuba. Others argue that the United States is more likely to encourage reforms in the country by gradually increasing engagement or even swiftly normalizing relations. ¶ Congressional debate surrounding the potential reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system has largely reflected the disagreements over broader U.S. policy toward the island. Members of Congress who support efforts to isolate Cuba have opposed any attempt to reintegrate the country into the inter-American system. Some Members have called for the United States to boycott the Summit of the Americas if Cuba is allowed to participate.81 They also introduced bills during the 112th Congress that would have prohibited U.S. contributions to the OAS if Cuba is allowed to participate in the organization or the Summits of the Americas before transitioning to democracy. Conversely, some Members who support greater U.S. engagement with Cuba have celebrated efforts that could pave the way to the country’s inclusion in hemispheric institutions.82 ¶ Congressional actions related to Cuba’s reintegration into the inter-American system could have broader implications for U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Congressional pressure designed to keep Cuba out of hemispheric institutions until it embraces democracy may continue to be successful given the desire of most countries in the region to maintain close relations with the United States and the OAS’s reliance on consensus decision-making. However, such a policy also sets the United States against a nearly hemispheric-wide consensus to allow Cuban participation in the Summits of the Americas, and could continue to be a distraction at regional meetings and an obstacle to more cohesive hemispheric relations. If Cuba is allowed to participate in the Summits of the Americas, the United States and the rest of the region could use the meetings to engage Cuba while still maintaining democracy and human rights as requirements for participation in the OAS itself. At the same time, by removing democratic governance as a precondition for participation in the summits, the nations of the hemisphere could send a signal that their commitment to democracy is less than absolute.

#### No other regional organization can take its place

Meyer 4/8/13 (Peter, CRS Analyst in Latin America Affairs, “Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress”, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=12&ved=0CDgQFjABOAo&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hsdl.org%2F%3Fview%26did%3D735022&ei=6RcaUsTSDMqT2QWrvYFI&usg=AFQjCNEJiXMS8Gf1AQ19Y\_PlL5Nj\_fXEGA&sig2=qNsFfyBS3N6r0sCguR\_JAw)

While many analysts acknowledge that the newer regional organizations can play important roles in the hemisphere, they also note that these groups have their own flaws. There is considerable variation among the regional organizations; however, most lack strong, independent, and well- financed secretariats capable of receiving mandates and carrying out programs.120 Instead, they often rely on high-level diplomacy and presidential summits, which can be useful for promoting political dialogue, but rarely result in significant, ongoing initiatives. Given these limitations, a number of analysts maintain that the OAS remains the pre-eminent political institution of the hemisphere. An Inter-American Dialogue task force on the OAS, for example, asserted that “no other organization has the necessary credibility and mandate to bring together the collective influence of the hemisphere’s countries to resolve disputes among member states, encourage compromise among governments on salient regional issues, credibly monitor national government performance on sensitive concerns, and press countries to change when they violate hemispheric norms.”121 ¶ Policy Considerations ¶ The rise of regional alternatives to the OAS presents both potential opportunities and challenges for the United States. One potential benefit of such organizations might be an increase in burden- sharing in the hemisphere. As the newer organizations evolve, they may be able to take on more responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in their sub-regions, which could enable Congress to dedicate scarce U.S. resources to other priorities. A division of labor among various organizations might also enable the OAS to better concentrate its efforts on its core agenda and thereby carry out its mandates more effectively. ¶ At the same time, an increasing role for other multilateral organizations could lead to a weaker, more divided OAS. If other organizations take on larger roles in the hemisphere, the role of the OAS would likely decline. Some Members of Congress argue that such a development could weaken U.S. influence in the hemisphere since the OAS is the only multilateral organization in which the United States is a member and shapes policy decisions.122 Moreover, the proliferation of regional organizations could further weaken the hemisphere’s ability to speak with one voice. For example, Mercosur and Unasur determined that the rapid June 2012 impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo constituted a break in the democratic order and sought to isolate the country by suspending it from participation.123 The OAS, on the other hand, concluded that the impeachment did not constitute a coup d’état, and member states decided not to suspend Paraguay from participating in the organization.

#### Border disputes are coming and escalate—the OAS solves hemispheric confidence-building

Herz April 08 (Monica, Director, Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Author of Ecuador vs. Peru, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F57413%2Fipublicationdocument\_singledocument%2Fdf9c52a2-2dc9-4ca6-9a4e-05fa2a399a31%2Fen%2FWP34.2.pdf&ei=q1IaUujIAavy2gX5yYCQAQ&usg=AFQjCNHJfVZsoHNpbVFXZrs\_-\_5MVpD-kA&sig2=QzMXH1oWhtsczkMOq4OosA)

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords.

#### That causes nuclear war and extinction

**Manwaring ‘5** – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson

(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as *Bolivarianismo.* More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65